OHCHR's challenge in Nepal
By - Jyotsna Poudyal
It could be argued that
since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006, the human
rights situation in Nepal has improved considerably. The war is over, the
insurgent party is now leading the government, people are no longer being
disappeared or abducted by the Nepal Army or the
Maoists; and killings, physical assaults, displacement and incidents of
violence have lessened. Although the end of war almost automatically leads to a
reduction in the number of human rights violations, the end of conflict by
itself does not guarantee protection and fulfilment of human rights. In Nepal, the situation remains the same in many aspects:
there has been no improvement in public accountability and political
independence of the police and the Nepal Army and the entrenched culture of
impunity. In fact, it is possible that impunity may become more formalised and entrenched during this
current transition period as many national and international actors hesitate to
challenge it fearing that it will "disturb" the peace process.
Individuals believed to have violated human
rights continue in their government positions. In the absence of effective
action by the state, human rights violations and criminality have actually
increased in the Tarai. Likewise, the Maoists'
commitment to the rule of law is questionable as demonstrated by the activities
of the Young Communist League (YCL). Sadly, the decision of the Nepali Congress
and the CPN-UML to form their own equivalents has only served to legitimize the
YCL and its methods. Many internally displaced persons have not been able to
return home, and complex transitional justice issues are yet to be addressed. The recent annual report of the National Human
Rights Commission (NHRC) raises many of these human rights issues. Consequently,
the human rights community in Nepal faces many challenges: ensuring justice and
reparations to those who suffered during the conflict, pressing for
accountability of past violations, and ensuring human rights becomes a basis of
state reconstitution. A strategy for the overall human rights community for
pressing accountability, justice and reparations needs to be
drawn up. For this, the role of two institutions -- the NHRC and the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) -- is central to
achieving these objectives in the coming days.
Established in the middle of the armed conflict
in 2000, the NHRC has survived turbulent times and has faced many challenges in
these eight years. They range from limited resources and support from the government
to a serious loss of credibility and support from key civil society actors
between the period when the former king hand-picked commissioners
in June 2005 and the fall of the royal government in 2006. This was
particularly sad as previous commissioners had built public
legitimacy for the NHRC with independent inquiries and reports such as on Doramba in September 2003.
Now, faced with an unresponsive government that
isn't keen on implementing its decisions, the new commissioners struggle with
the challenges of resolving disappearance and abduction cases, pushing for accountability
and prosecution to combat impunity, addressing the large case backlog, and
reaching out to Nepalis who remain vulnerable to
various forms of human rights violations. In addition, addressing the human
rights situation in the Tarai is another major challenge as the NHRC has to operate within a space affected
by political tensions and divided along ethnic and caste lines.
Likewise, the OHCHR,
which initially enjoyed strong support from all segments of Nepali society
including political parties, faces new challenges: decreasing political
support, addressing the issues of the Tarai and the
situation of impunity, improving institutional accountability in the police and
the Nepal Army, and, particularly, strengthening the relationship with the NHRC
which seems to have gone through a tough time recently -- a fact that came to
light in July this year after one of the NHRC commissioners made a public
statement against the OHCHR.
The decrease in political support may be due to
the changed political context. The political parties who were
"victims" of human rights violations back in 2005 are now the
government responsible for human rights protection and now seem less
enthusiastic about OHCHR scrutiny.
During most of the conflict, the NHRC had no or
illegitimate commissioners. With the appointment of new commissioners in 2007,
the commission got a promising opportunity to rebuild its lost credibility and
visibility. As the two institutions - NHRC and OHCHR - are now
"While the NHRC needs to explore ways to
challenge cases that they have investigated in the national court, the OHCHR is
in a position to provide technical inputs to investigations and litigations as
they have access to international experts who have worked in international tribunals,"
she states. However, she concludes that "any
formal agreement between the two organizations should not curtail the mandate of
the OHCHR".
For the OHCHR, an important indicator of its
success will be how strong a national human rights institution it leaves
behind. For this, it is important for the OHCHR and the NHRC to forge an
alliance that will enable the NHRC to strengthen its capacity in monitoring, investigating,
interviewing, promoting, reporting and human rights analysis. Such a
capacity-building exercise needs to take place within the political context,
such as through mutually agreed collaboration on investigations, monitoring and
reporting, and not just through individual trainings to NHRC staff. This kind
of mentoring is more likely to enhance the NHRC's capacity to apply human
rights investigative skills and analysis to their work. Likewise, the NHRC possesses
a strong understanding of local cultures and changing political dynamics; their
analysis could inform the OHCHR and help it to negotiate space for human rights
with the government by mobilizing international actors.
In the current political environment, the NHRC
alone will not be able to address post-conflict justice and human rights
violations. We need both institutions -- the NHRC, which is
strong enough to fight for the protection of human rights for Nepalis, and the OHCHR, which is strategic enough to
negotiate space for human rights work and support the government's work in
bringing an end to impunity, reforming the criminal justice system and
strengthening the capacity of the NHRC while maintaining a clear exit strategy
for itself.
